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*Our Commerce with Russia, in Peace and War.* By J. T. DANSON, Esq.,  
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[Read before the Statistical Society, 19th June, 1854.]

PART I.—PRELIMINARY.

THE purpose of this paper is to afford materials for answering the question—

*What is likely to be the effect of the war we are now engaged in upon our commerce with Russia?*

It will be observed, in the first place, that we have taken the initiative in the war; and that its immediate operation, under the aspect suggested by this question, is unusually simple in form. It consists only in a blockade of the Russian ports, we having no access to her land frontiers. And these ports all open upon inland seas, egress from which must be extremely difficult in the face of a hostile fleet. In other words, we have little more to consider than the effect of our own acts upon our own share of the maritime commerce of Russia.

Obviously, then, the first thing wanted is a clear account of the commerce of Russia, in general; then a similar account of our share in it; and, finally, whatever authentic data may be available on which to estimate the probable influence of the steps we have taken to put a stop to commercial intercourse between the two countries.

At the very outset of the inquiry, however, it becomes apparent that the commerce of Russia, as well as the country itself, and the people, are marked by features broadly distinguishing each from any other we are acquainted with. And, if not at first sight equally apparent, it may be reasonably suspected that these peculiarities have an important bearing upon the present subject. Hence it is necessary to a right understanding of what we are about, that they should first receive some attention.

A great deal has been said of the enormous extent of Russia;

but the extent of what now concerns us is not greater than can easily be brought within manageable limits. The area of Russia in Europe, according to M. de Koeppen, may be taken, exclusive of Poland, to be about 2,000,000 of English square miles. A large space; but not without parallel. The United States of America, including their share of the Oregon territory, as settled by the treaty of 1846, is supposed, upon data at least equally sound, to contain 2,500,000 square miles. And British North America, extending as it does from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and from the northern frontier of the United States to the Arctic Sea, is about as large as the United States, or about one-fourth larger than Russia in Europe. Extent of territory is but one of the elements of national power; and, unless duly combined with the rest, is apt to prove a source of weakness rather than of strength.

The Russian census of 1838, increased in its results, according to the same authority, by about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. per annum, gives us, for the population of this area, in 1854, about 62,000,000 souls.\*

It is true that Russia in Europe includes less than one-third in extent of what is called the Russian Empire; but the remainder may, for our present purpose, be put aside, seeing, (1) that its population cannot be set down, upon data similar to those above-mentioned, at more than six or seven millions; (2) that over some three millions of this number, inhabiting the four provinces south of the Caucasus, the Russian government has never exercised an undisputed authority, and has now no effective control whatever; (3) that the three or four millions more, supposed to be scattered over the vast territory east of the Oural mountains, shut in as they are between lofty mountain-ranges and the Arctic Sea, are utterly without influence upon any European question; and (4) that the Russian colonies in America are, and, from their position are likely to remain, perfectly insignificant.

The quasi-kingdom of Poland might well be dealt with apart. Whether we consider the country or the people, we find ample reason for deeming it naturally no part of Russia, properly so called; and we know that the political tie is maintained only on the compulsion of an authority, the future maintenance of which is open to some doubt. In order, however, to shorten the work before us, we may include the kingdom of Poland, the area of which is estimated at rather more than 50,000 square miles, and the population now exceeds 5,200,000. This will make the total area, now to be considered, about 2,050,000 square miles (English), and the population, in the present year, about 67,000,000.

If we now turn to a map of Russia, we observe that, of the fifty-two governments or provinces within the space in view, nine may be said to border on the Baltic Sea, or to be very closely con-

\* The population of the United Kingdom being about 29,000,000, and that of France 36,000,000, making together 65,000,000, Russia, if we add the 5,000,000 or 6,000,000 in Poland, may be said to have more than both its opponents. But, again, population is only one of the elements of national power. Wealth, civilization, national character, and the extent to which the natural resources of the country have been developed, are others: in all of which Russia is obviously and largely inferior to either of her opponents

nected with it by navigable rivers, and consequently open to the immediate influence of a hostile fleet in that sea. They are enumerated below, going from north to south; and may, for the sake of distinction, be termed

*The Baltic Provinces.*

- |                               |                           |
|-------------------------------|---------------------------|
| 1. The Grand Duchy of Finland | 6. Courland               |
| 2. St. Petersburg             | 7. Vilna                  |
| 3. Esthonia                   | 8. Grodno                 |
| 4. Livonia                    | and                       |
| 5. Vitebsk                    | 9. The Kingdom of Poland. |

It may be inferred, from the most authentic data yet available, that the total population of these nine provinces amounts to about 12,400,000.

Of this total, not more than 1,700,000 can be supposed to inhabit Finland, giving an average (if we deduct one-fourth of the area of the country, on account of the lakes there abounding) of about 17 to the English square mile.

In the seven provinces extending southwards, from St. Petersburg to Grodno inclusive, there are probably now, according to the method of computation adopted by M. de Koeppen, a population of about 5,500,000. The area of this group being about 106,000 square miles, the average density of its population would be about 52 per square mile. But here, it should be observed, that the density increases, with remarkable regularity, as we proceed from the northern to the southern end of the group—the proportion for the province of St. Petersburg (exclusive of the city) being about 42, and that for the province of Grodno about 68, per square mile.

The kingdom of Poland, with its population of about 5,200,000, upon an area of less than 51,000 square miles, has an average of about 103 per square mile.

If we now turn again to the map, it will be observed that, bordering upon the Black Sea, or immediately served by rivers more or less navigable, and debouching in that sea, are five other provinces, which we may call

*The Black Sea Provinces.*

- |               |                           |
|---------------|---------------------------|
| 1. Bessarabia | 4. Ekaterinoslav, and     |
| 2. Kherson    | 5. The country of the Don |
| 3. Taurida    | Cossacks.                 |

These may be taken together as covering an area of about 160,000 square miles (English). Their population, estimated upon the basis before referred to, may be supposed to be, in the present year, about 4,150,000, giving an average density of only 26 per square mile. But this density varies materially in the different provinces, and is probably in each somewhat as under:—

	Population per Sq. Mile.
Bessarabia .....	48
Kherson (including the city of Odessa) .....	29
Taurida .....	25
Ekaterinoslav .....	36
Country of the Don Cossacks .....	11

It will be remembered that no part of the territory comprised in the two districts, thus distinguished as "*the Baltic provinces*" and "*the Black Sea provinces*," formed part of the Russian Empire until about 150 years ago; and that the greater part of it, more particularly in the south, has been brought under the dominion of the czars within less than half that period.\* And great as is the extent of these border provinces, and though without them Russia would have no communication by sea with the rest of the world, except through the Arctic Ocean, their condition, and the commerce carried on through them with other countries, affords good reason for regarding them as not yet permanently amalgamated with the central provinces.

Turn we now to these central provinces. Here we soon perceive that Moscow is still the true capital of Russia.† St. Petersburg, as a recent French writer has well observed, is rather "the bow-window at which the imperial court and government take the air of European civilization."‡ In the central provinces around Moscow, knit

\* *The Crimea*.—Conquered by the Turks A.D. 1475; but left under the rule of native khans. In 1774, Catherine of Russia stipulated for the independence of the khans. In 1783, she took forcible possession of the country, and annexed it to the Russian Empire. In January, 1784, Turkey acquiesced by treaty. Then began the naval power of Russia in the Black Sea. The country is united to the mainland by an isthmus about five miles wide. Its estimated extent is about 15,000 square miles. Population unknown; but thinly scattered. Chiefly Tartars, with some Russians, Greeks, and Germans; but living much apart from each other. Their occupations chiefly pastoral. The land fertile; but the climate said to be unhealthy: probably from want of drainage and cultivation. The prevalent faith is Mohammedan.

*Bessarabia*.—Formed part of Turkey till 1809. In April of that year, Russia declared war against Turkey; it is supposed in pursuance of an agreement with Napoleon, at Erfurt, in October, 1808. The Turks, though unaided, resisted gallantly till the spring of 1812, when Russia, then on the eve of a war with France, made peace (28th May, 1812), adding Bessarabia to the empire, and thus advancing her frontier to the Pruth, and, from the mouth of that river, down the Danube to the Kilia, its most northern *embouchure* in the Black Sea.

*The Delta of the Danube*.—Taken by Russia under the peace of Adrianople (14th September, 1829), which ended the war against Turkey begun by Russia 26th April, 1828. Russia thus acquired all the three mouths of the Danube. At the same time, Russia took power from Turkey to establish *quarantine*, not only at the river's mouth, but between the southern and northern portions of the Turkish part of the river, or between Bulgaria and Moldo-Wallachia. This power, being exercised at the discretion of Russia, has been used to obstruct the commerce of the river, by delays, fees to officials, &c. It should be observed, however, that the treaty of Vienna (1815) had made the Danube a free way for all nations, and had prohibited any increase of tolls without the consent of all the states bordering on the river; at the same time burdening these states with the maintenance of the towing-paths, and the removal of all obstructions to the navigation. In 1840, Russia and Austria agreed that the former should levy a toll on vessels entering the middle (or Sulina) mouth, and should keep it free from obstructions. The toll has been taken; but the work has been neglected.

† Moscow is not only the true capital of Russia, but is also the chief seat of Russian manufactures. According to Haxthausen, from 80,000 to 90,000 of the population leave the city every summer to work in the country; and return, after harvest, to their work in the factories.

‡ "Cette capitale est la ville d'apparat de l'autocratie Russe, la fenêtre de balcon à laquelle le gouvernement impérial, la cour, et les hauts fonctionnaires de l'état hument le grand air de la civilisation Européenne."—M. Ch. Vogel, *Journal des Economistes*, No. 142.

together by a language, customs, and feelings of its own, and forming the Russia of Cromwell's time, we still find the real empire of the czars. St. Petersburg, a century and a half after its foundation, still broadly exhibits its artificial character in its very census. Take that of September, 1832, the last of which we have the details, and mark the very large excess of males in its population of every class. We are told that in that year there were of

	Males.	Females.
Clergy .....	1,034	740
Nobles .....	24,342	18,426
Merchants .....	7,121	4,319
Burghers .....	25,914	14,789
Foreigners .....	9,160	5,502
Military .....	45,324	9,883
Artizans .....	7,020	4,065
Servants .....	68,480	34,457
Peasants .....	116,974	24,752
Various .....	33,877	23,814
Total .....	339,246	140,477*

\* Board of Trade Tables, 1820-33.—Consuls' Returns, p. 540.

No explanation of this extraordinary disproportion has yet been offered, which does not either assume or indirectly admit the existence of a state of society in some degree compulsory.\*

\* The state of the population of St. Petersburg, as exhibited in the census of 1832, may be more justly appreciated if we consider that, under normal conditions, a large proportion of the fixed population of any given locality must be under fifteen years of age; and that among these the numbers of each sex may be safely assumed to be nearly equal: seeing that they are everywhere born in nearly equal numbers, and that the causes which operate upon the local distribution of the sexes can scarcely have much influence before that age. According to M. Quetelet (*Sur l'Homme*, &c., b. i. cap. 7), the proportion of the population under 15 in Belgium, in 1829, was 33 per cent., and in Sweden, in 1820, it was 32 per cent. Taking only 20 per cent. as the proportion for St. Petersburg, we have (in 1832) an adult population of 383,000, composed of 291,000 males and 92,000 females, or more than 3 men to 1 woman.

Again, if, without reference to the probable existence of children in such a city, we deduct only the military (45,324 men and 9,883 women) and the foreigners (9,160 men and 5,502 women), we find that the remainder of the population of St. Petersburg, of all ages, bears the proportion of about 16 females to 35 males. But the foreigners, taken alone, have a proportion more natural than this, or about 21 females to 35 males. Whence it may be truly said that, in this important particular, the Russian population of St. Petersburg, apart from the military, seem still to reside there rather as foreigners than as natives. Mr. McCulloch (*Geographical Dictionary*, Art. *Petersburg*) states the population of 1836 at 451,974, composed of 330,064 males and 121,410 females, a proportion even less natural than that shown by the census of 1832. This writer attempts to account for the disproportion by referring it to the three classes of *military*, of *servants*, and of *peasantry*. But the details of 1832 forbid the acceptance of any such explanation, as they show that the disproportion is unusually large in every class of natives, from the highest to the lowest.

Around Moscow we find the ten most densely peopled provinces of the empire. These we may call—

*The Central Provinces.*

1. Moscow	6. Tambov
2. Tver	7. Riazan
3. Jaroslavl	8. Toula
4. Vladimir	9. Kalouga, and
5. Nijni Novgorod	10. Smolensk.

Relying upon the data of, and following the method used by, M. de Koeppen, for ascertaining the population of the empire in 1846, we may estimate the total population of these provinces at about 14,000,000, and their united area at about 175,000 square miles (English), or about twice the size of Great Britain. The density of the population, however, appears to vary, from 121 in the province of Moscow, and 115 in that of Toula (adjoining Moscow on the south), to 59 only in Smolensk, and 56 in Tver, the central provinces nearest to *St. Petersburg* being also those which are *most thinly peopled*.\*

The comparative density of the population in the three groups of provinces thus selected—showing us how the people with whom we trade are located—may therefore be shortly stated thus:—

	Population per Sq. Mile. (English).
In Finland .....	17
In the Baltic Provinces, exclusive of Finland and Poland	52
In Poland .....	103
In the Black Sea provinces .....	26
In the central provinces .....	80
Throughout Russia in Europe .....	31

These details, then, conduct us to the important conclusion, that the people of Russia, as we have now to deal with them, are grouped round two main centres, one of which is Moscow, and the other Warsaw. Putting aside all reference to despotic political arrangements, we thus discover the natural centres of production and consumption; and in the connection existing between the productive powers and the external wants of these localities, on the one hand, and the nature of the commerce carried on by sea between Russia and the rest of the world, on the other, we may hope to find sure indications of the probable operation of a maritime war upon the Russian people in a mercantile point of view.

## PART II.—THE COMMERCE OF RUSSIA.

The productive powers of the Russian people are yet small: hence they have not much to exchange with foreigners. The population of the United Kingdom numbers about 29,000,000, and sends abroad, in exchange for foreign commodities, British produce to an

\* The significance of these figures will be more readily apprehended if it be remembered that the average for England and Wales, in 1841, was 275 per square mile; and that, at that date, Westmoreland, the least populous county in England, had 74, and Radnor, the least populous in Wales, had 59 to the square mile; while Lancashire had 944, and Middlesex 5,590, per square mile.

amount which cannot now be stated at a value less than 90,000,000*l.* sterling, or more than 60*s.* per head per annum. The French people, numbering some 36 millions, annually exchange a similar value of nearly 60,000,000*l.*, or about 33*s.* per head. The 67,000,000 of the Russian people export produce to the amount, at most, of 14,000,000*l.* a-year; say 4*s.* 2*d.* per head. In other words, their foreign commerce, in relation to their numbers, is about one-eighth of that of France, and about one-fifteenth of that of the United Kingdom.

Its nature is exactly such as its amount would indicate. While we export *manufactured* produce almost entirely, and the exports of our French neighbours are also largely of the same nature, the exports of Russia are, with scarcely an exception, of raw produce.\*

The total value of the exports and imports may be gathered from the following figures, which relate to the commerce of the two years 1847 and 1848:—

*Value of Exports from European Russia.*

	Total.	To Great Britain.
	£	£
In 1847 .....	21,234,462	7,363,681
„ 1848 .....	12,023,469	6,324,343

*Value of Imports into European Russia.*

	Total.	From Great Britain.
	£	£
In 1847 .....	11,464,616	3,513,650
„ 1848 .....	11,945,456	4,178,542

The excess of the exports to Great Britain, as compared with the imports from the same country, is partly accounted for by the transmission of tropical produce direct from British colonies to Russia.

The high value of the Russian exports in 1847 was unusual, and

\* The great natural source of Russian wealth is agriculture. But to this source little or no attention has yet been given by the government—in other respects so active in promoting the aggrandisement of the empire. Here, again, we may refer to the United States of America as affording an example of a similar area, inhabited by a different people. The first English settlement on the American continent was made, by a private company, in Virginia, A.D. 1607 (Michael Fedorowitz, the founder of the reigning dynasty of Russia, and grandfather of Peter the Great, ascended the throne A.D. 1613). The population of the United States of America, in 1850, was 23,263,000. The value of their exports of home produce, in the year ending 30th June, 1850, was 136,946,000 dollars (about twice the value of the average annual exports of Russia), equivalent to about 23*s.* 6*d.* per head. The exports of the United States are almost entirely agricultural, the manufactured produce not amounting to so much as one-twelfth in value of the whole. Those of Russia may be said to be also entirely agricultural; and were the industry of both countries freed from artificial restriction, it cannot be doubted that in both it would be turned almost exclusively into this channel for a very long period to come, and that to the great benefit of all concerned.—See “*Les Etats Unis d’Amérique*, par S. G. Goodrich, Consul des Etats Unis d’Amérique à Paris. 1852.”



arose almost entirely from the great demand for, and high price of, *corn* in that year. This is apparent in the following table, showing the principal items of the exports of the same two years, these being the two latest years for which the Russian accounts have yet been published in a complete form :—

*Value of Principal Exports from European Russia.*

	1847.	1848.
	£	£
Grain and flour .....	11,205,625	3,418,691
Tallow .....	2,322,771	2,352,726
Flax .....	1,439,159	1,445,567
Linseed .....	1,398,966	1,186,116
Hemp .....	1,199,400	1,013,039
Wool .....	667,991	343,517
Timber .....	593,209	389,168
Bristles .....	281,845	341,296

Here the accounts for 1848 may be taken to represent nearly the ordinary state of trade; and that of 1847 to show how it is liable to be altered by a large and sudden demand for corn.

The imports into Russia consist, with few and small exceptions, of (1) the produce of more southern, and of tropical countries, required by the civilized habits of the nobles, and the higher classes of the town population; of (2) manufactured articles, having almost exclusively the same destination; and (3) of raw materials and machinery for the nursing of some native manufactures, under a system of "protection to native industry," very costly to the country, but too recently in our own use to be fairly open to severe condemnation in England.

The table on the next page, compiled from Russian accounts, shows the main features of the import trade in the two years 1847 and 1848.

In the first five items of this account, the bulk of the population of Russia cannot be supposed to have much personal interest. The same may be said of No. 7. In No. 6, the population is generally interested, as in a necessary article of food.\* Nos. 8 and 9 afford materials to factories, chiefly in the central provinces, which, under high protective duties, and consequently at high prices, supply cotton, silken, and woollen fabrics to such part of the ignoble population as can afford such luxuries—the nobles very generally disdaining the use of what comes from the native looms.

\* The salt exported from the United Kingdom in 1851 amounted to 18,233,405 bushels, and went chiefly to the following customers :—

	Bushels.
The United States.....	6,747,218
British North America .....	2,086,110
British East Indies .....	2,534,616
Russia .....	2,010,585
Prussia .....	1,229,715

The specific gravity of salt being about 2·126, and the imperial bushel containing 80 lbs. of water, the bushel may be taken to be equal to 40 lbs. of salt. The Russian military allowance of salt is said to be about 24 lbs. per man per annum. Assuming that the Russian population, supplied with British salt, consumed on an

*Value of Principal Imports into European Russia.*

	1847.	1848.
	£	£
1. Sugar .....	1,359,634	1,374,947
2. Coffee .....	204,744	256,386
3. Tobacco .....	400,803	353,840
4. Wine .....	925,477	1,024,681
5. Fruit .....	367,218	378,835
	3,257,876	3,388,689
6. Salt .....	340,516	361,913
7. Textile manufactures—		
Silks.....	523,254	464,670
Woollens .....	332,181	260,985
Cottons .....	187,211	161,381
Linens .....	79,039	69,111
	1,121,685	956,147
8. Textile materials—		
Cotton, raw.....	884,718	1,301,612
„ yarn .....	831,246	764,891
Silk .....	622,911	624,739
Wool .....	280,031	274,345
9. Dye stuffs .....	883,994	854,568
	3,502,900	3,820,155

average 20 lbs. per head per annum, the 2,010,585 bushels sent thither in 1851 may have provided for a population of about 4,000,000. The greater part, however, of the salt we send to Prussia enters at the port of Dantzic; and its increase, even by the entire Russian supply, and its transmission thence to the Russian consumers, presents, while Prussia remains neutral, no difficulties likely to produce dangerous discontent in the latter country.

Further, it may be observed, that Russia in Europe, taken altogether, is not ill supplied with salt. It would appear, from a statistical work recently published (Paris, Renouard) by M. de Tegoborski, entitled “*Études sur les Forces Productives de la Russie*,” that the native mines are sufficient for the food of double the present population. But the places of production are so distant from Poland and the Baltic provinces as to make it cheaper to import salt for those districts. The richest of the native mines are in the governments of Orenbourg and Astrachan, Irkoutsk (in Siberia), and in Russian Armenia. The chief sources of foreign supply are the mines of Bochnia and Wieliezka, in Galicia, which are said to furnish nearly one-fifth of the whole quantity annually consumed in the empire, this quantity being, by Russian estimate, about 36,000,000 *poods*. It is said that 500,000 *poods* of salt are annually obtained from the salt-lakes of Russia alone.

The mines and lakes are monopolised by the government; and the sale of their produce, at a rouble per *pood*, brings to the revenue about 10,000,000 roubles per annum.

There is, therefore, but little probability, looking at the facilities of internal transport possessed by the Russians, that (even if the German supply as well as our own were withdrawn) the want of salt would lead (as some recent writers have suggested) to any rebellious movement among the scattered and ill-informed population of Western Russia. Yet it may be useful to observe that the natural salt supply affords a popular reason for adding Galicia to Poland, and these, as one state, to the western provinces of Russia—and that, too, a reason which must always be made more palpable by hostilities between Russia and her neighbours.

Speaking in general terms, it may be said that the peasantry produce the exports, and the nobles and the higher class of burghers consume the imports.

The next table exhibits the distribution of the trade upon the northern and southern coasts of the empire, so far as this may be inferred from the relative quantity of shipping employed in carrying it on.

*Tonnage of Vessels of all Nations, Entered Inwards and Cleared Outwards, in Russian Ports.*

ENTERED.					
Ports.	1844.	1845.	1846.	1847.	1848.
	Tons.	Tons.	Tons.	Tons.	Tons.
On the Baltic.....	515,104	498,910	598,716	838,046	645,836
White Sea .....	72,614	94,678	129,292	118,588	51,196
Black Sea and Sea of Azof.....}	511,944	533,470	570,714	969,554	615,076
Caspian .....	8,122	8,346	9,756	9,880	10,972
Total .....	1,107,784	1,135,404	1,308,472	1,936,068	1,323,080
Entered with cargoes	455,242	537,604	487,880	454,908	533,330

  

CLEARED.					
Total .....	1,090,004	1,145,822	1,345,728	1,998,568	1,177,994
Cleared with cargoes	1,064,238	1,121,092	1,308,968	1,915,876	1,065,758

The business of exchanging the exports for the imports may be said to be almost exclusively in the hands of foreigners, and is carried on almost entirely with foreign capital.\* This is, in some degree, apparent in the shipping returns, where we find that, notwithstanding the most strenuous efforts of the government, continued during several generations, to make Russia a maritime power, not more than one-sixth of the shipping entering at and leaving Russian ports is registered as belonging to Russian subjects.

\* The nobles, as a class, are too dignified, and the rest of the population at present too ignorant, to undertake with advantage the conduct of the foreign exchange. But for this ignorance, as well as for the corresponding lack of capital in Russian hands, the government is in part to blame, through its restrictions upon Russian industry and enterprise, and the consequent narrowing of the intercourse of its subjects with their more enlightened neighbours.

*Tonnage of Vessels (in Lasts) in Russian Ports (including those in Ballast.)*

ENTERED.				
		1847.	1848.	
		Lasts.	Lasts.	
Russian .....		119,542	94,849	
British .....		285,890	312,668	
Total .....		968,034	661,540	
CLEARED.				
Russian .....		124,781	100,222	
British .....		293,063	245,874	
Total .....		999,274	588,997	

With this account may be contrasted one showing the proportion of Russian shipping appearing among the vessels entering at, and clearing from, our own ports:—

*Tonnage of Shipping, Entered Inwards and Cleared Outwards, in the Foreign Trade, at Ports of the United Kingdom, (excluding those in Ballast,) and distinguishing those belonging to British and to Russian Subjects.*

ENTERED.					
	1847.	1848.	1849.	1850.	
	Tons.	Tons.	Tons.	Tons.	
British .....	4,238,956	4,020,415	4,390,375	4,070,544	
Russian .....	80,420	76,108	80,219	88,289	
Other countries.....	1,771,676	1,482,938	1,600,675	1,954,864	
Total .....	6,091,052	5,579,461	6,071,269	6,113,696	
CLEARED.					
British .....	3,205,794	3,553,777	3,762,182	3,960,764	
Russian .....	42,600	52,777	57,422	74,965	
Other countries.....	1,470,847	1,444,683	1,610,304	1,871,249	
Total .....	4,719,241	5,051,237	5,429,908	5,906,978	

Whence it appears that the Russian ships seen in our ports form scarcely 2 *per cent.* of the whole; or, in other words, taking all vessels at an average size, about 1 in 50 only are Russian.

The capital embarked in the conduct of the trade between the United Kingdom and Russia is well known to belong almost wholly to British subjects. England, however, in this instance, only acts upon a rule sufficiently common to be applicable, more or less, to

every nation with which she has dealings. It is with nations as with individuals, when two or more are concerned in the same transaction, the capital required is sure, in the long run, to be supplied in proportions varying with the disposable wealth of the parties. Having, as a people, a greater command of capital than any other, we find it advantageous to supply what is required in our trade with foreigners to an extent which is practically limited only by the demand for it, on the one side, and the prospect of security, and an adequate rate of interest, on the other. Of this fact, however, it would obviously be difficult to afford any satisfactory statistical proof apart from certain assumptions touching the action of the foreign exchanges which might reasonably be deemed foreign to the present purpose. Nor does this purpose seem to involve a necessity for formal proof of the fact, though its statement is of some interest with regard to the general question.

It remains to be observed, that though there is said to be only one good paved road in the empire—that from St. Petersburg to Moscow—the means of transport for goods between the interior and the coast are naturally good. The country forming, with hardly an exception, one vast plain, which is covered with snow for some months every year, sledge travelling is easy, and almost equally easy in any direction.\* And further, the country is intersected with numerous rivers, which have already, and at no great expense, been so connected by canals as to form a network of waterways along which goods may be conveyed, at small cost, and with little or no interruption, from any of the provinces of the empire to the White Sea, the Baltic, the Black Sea, or the Caspian.†

Of the Russian tariff, I need scarcely say more than that it is so framed as to keep out almost all our manufactures, except at such prices, duty paid, as prevents their use by any class below that of the nobles, who, as they travel much, and are accustomed to all the arts and conveniences of civilized life in use among the corresponding classes in England and France, habitually draw from these countries the means of supplying them. To the Russian people, as a body, the manufactures of other countries are yet almost unknown.‡

\* L'hiver, long et rigoureux, qui pèse sur la plus grande partie de la Russie, quoique défavorable à l'industrie sous d'autres rapports, lui procure cependant l'avantage d'avoir pendant quatre ou cinq mois de l'année d'excellentes routes, préférables aux meilleures chaussées que l'art pourroit construire. Les commodités que le transport des marchandises retire du *trainage*, passent de beaucoup l'idée qu'on s'en fait en d'autres pays."—Storch, "Cours d'Économie Politique," liv. i. chap. 9. (St. Petersburg, 1815).

† The Volga, debouching in the Caspian, draws its waters from an area, the north-western confines of which come within 100 miles of St. Petersburg; and, with its tributaries, forms a system of water-carriage which serves nearly the whole of Central Russia, and finds its natural centre at Nijni-Novgorod, the locality of the great fair. The Dnieper, the Vistula, and the Niemen are also connected, so that the mouth of each may be reached through either of the others.

‡ The protective tariff of Russia seems to have been adopted under the influence of common European example, and to have grown more protective as the country multiplied its ties to the states-system of Europe. The tariff of 1767 was not so unfavourable to our commerce with Russia as to prevent its steady growth, at a rate quite in accordance with the increasing wealth and civilization of the two countries. But that substituted for it on 1st January, 1783, raised the duties on

In short, the direct influence of the government upon the foreign trade of Russia has been used chiefly to keep down the consumption of foreign articles, the greater part of which cannot be produced at all in Russia; and the remainder are such as can only be there produced by diverting Russian capital and labour into channels it would never flow into under free trade; and the indirect influence implied in the example of the court has done little to counteract this. Rude domestic manufactures, for the supply of the bulk of the population, and their sale at periodical fairs, under a method of commerce which has now fallen into disuse throughout the greater part of the rest of Europe—in other words, a cumbrous and costly mode of supplying the inevitable wants of the people—is thus defended against the innovations and improvements which modern civilization is elsewhere gradually, and in most places rapidly, introducing. And as fairs supply the place of fixed entrepôts, with frequent and rapid transit between them, so travelling journeymen supply through the greater part of the country the want of local mechanical skill.

### PART III.—COMMERCE BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM.

What sort of customers for our produce we have hitherto had in the Russian people may be gathered from the following account of their purchases during the last seven years:—

*Declared Value of British and Irish Produce Exported from the United Kingdom to Russia, distinguishing the northern ports from those on the Black Sea, and to all the World, as compared with the total to Russia, in the seven years 1846-52.*

Years.	To Northern Ports of Russia.	To Russian Ports in the Black Sea.	Total to Russia.	Total to all the World.
	£	£	£	£
1846 .....	1,586,235	138,913	1,725,148	57,786,876
1847 .....	1,700,733	143,810	1,844,543	58,842,377
1848 .....	1,692,006	233,220	1,925,226	52,849,445
1849 .....	1,379,179	186,996	1,566,175	63,596,025
1850 .....	1,297,660	157,111	1,454,771	71,367,885
1851 .....	1,157,543	132,161	1,289,704	74,448,722
1852 .....	994,330	105,587	1,099,917	78,076,854*
Averages for the seven years ....}	1,401,098	156,828	1,557,926	65,281,169

\* The British exports for 1853 exceeded 95,000,000*l*.

most articles of British manufacture in proportions varying from 50 to 300 per cent. The new duties were also so levied as to bear, with especial force, upon the carrying trade previously carried on by British subjects between southern Europe and the Baltic ports of Russia—doubtless partly to promote Russian trade through the newly acquired territories on the Black Sea. The tariff of January, 1851, replacing that of 1841, removes a prohibition on the import of cotton-cloths, and imposes duties varying from 48 copecks to 2 silver roubles 50 copecks *per pound weight*; but increases considerably the duties on woollen cloths, previously admitted. The measure looks much more like an attempt to strengthen the barrier against our produce, by reducing the premium on smuggling, than an advance towards sounder principles.

It will be observed that, while the declared value of our exports of British produce to all the world has increased from 57,000,000*l.* sterling at the beginning of this period to 78,000,000*l.* at the end of it, the value of what has been sent to Russia has fallen off with similar regularity and in a much larger proportion. But assuming that this diminution may possibly have arisen from causes of a temporary character, and taking, as a broader and safer ground of comparison, the average of each column for the whole seven years, we find that the Russian demand for British produce is only about 2½ per cent. of the whole; or, in other words, that, of every 100*l.* worth of goods we turned out for exportation during the seven years in view, Russia bought only to the value of about 2*l.* 6*s.*

This account, however, concerns only the produce of the United Kingdom. We have also exported to Russia large quantities of foreign and colonial produce.

In the Russian account of imports for 1848, we find Great Britain set down for a total value of 26,390,795 *silver roubles*, which, (according to the official accounts) is equal to about 4,178,542*l.* The following chief items will afford some idea of how this total was composed.

*Value of the principal Imports into European Russia from Great Britain in 1848.*

	Silver Roubles.
Cotton, raw .....	6,498,472
"    yarn .....	4,662,862
Wool .....	1,393,939
Dye stuffs .....	2,253,676
Machinery .....	1,343,619
Coal .....	1,067,823
	<hr/>
	17,220,391
Raw sugar .....	509,794
Salt .....	1,342,324
Drugs .....	730,817
Woven fabrics .....	1,477,823
Furs .....	419,025
	<hr/>
	21,699,174
	<hr/>
Total .....	26,390,795*

Thus, about two-thirds (in value) of what has been taken into Russian ports from this country has, according to Russian accounts, consisted of the materials for making at home what we could undoubtedly have made for her, better and more cheaply, in this country: a result of high duties on our manufactures which may be perfectly agreeable to the tendencies of the Russian government, but which cannot conduce to the welfare or to the real power of the Russian people, and as certainly tends to restrict their intercourse with the rest of the world, and thus to retard their advancement in civilization.

The real extent of the trade between this country and Russia, however, is greater than can be exhibited in any accounts yet extant in either country. On the one hand, much of what Russia obtains

\* The average rate of exchange being about 3*s.* 2*d.* per silver rouble.

from other countries is paid for in Russian produce sent to this country, and balanced by British produce sent either directly to the country which thus becomes our creditor, or elsewhere to meet bills drawn by us in favour of the creditor country. On the other hand, much of the tropical and other produce imported from other countries into Russia is so imported under British orders and in British vessels. It has been seen (*ante* p. 203) that, from two-fifths to one-half of the vessels entering Russian ports before the war broke out were British—and, notwithstanding the restrictions placed by the government of St. Petersburg upon the action of foreigners as merchants in Russian ports, it is well known that the foreign trade of the country is almost entirely in the hands of foreigners, among whom our fellow subjects are, and have long been, by much the most numerous.

The two following tables exhibit a tolerably complete view of the direct trade between Great Britain and Russia: the first showing, from our trade accounts, the share taken by Russia of each of the principal items of our *export* trade, alike of home and of foreign and colonial produce; and the next the amount contributed by Russia to each of the items of our *import* trade in which that country has any considerable share.

*The principal Articles of British Produce exported in 1850, with the share of each taken by Russia.*

	Exported to Russia.		Total Declared Value exported from Great Britain.
	Northern Ports.	Southern Ports.	
	£	£	£
Cotton twist and yarn.....	244,755	870	6,383,704
Coals, cinders, and culm.....	73,670	8,196	1,284,224
Lead and shot.....	63,826	1,926	387,394
Woollen manufactures.....	61,838	4,418	13,047,419
Cotton „.....	59,183	2,013	21,873,697
Hardwares and cutlery.....	58,748	2,024	2,641,432
Tin, unwrought.....	35,957	1,790	124,798
Iron and steel, wrought and un- wrought.....}	36,052	4,009	5,350,056
Salt.....	27,001	1,408	224,501
Beer.....	12,763	3,790	558,794
Silk manufactures.....	8,457	122	1,255,641
Linen yarn.....	7,279	....	881,312
Earthenware.....	4,716	1,969	999,448
Linen manufactures.....	4,399	1,015	3,947,682
Apparel, slops, &c.....	4,234	600	2,379,800
Brass and copper manufactures....	1,392	1,340	1,978,196
Glass.....	1,589	2,064	289,420
Plate, jewellery, &c.....	5,348	566	296,078
Stationery.....	3,654	156	408,380

We may infer, from this account, that the principal consumers of British produce are found in the barracks, bureaux, and palaces of St. Petersburg—with two notable exceptions: one being the salt, a condiment necessary to all classes, and scarce in western Russia; and the other, some materials for the protected manufactures carried on in the central districts.



The following table shows the comparative importance of the principal articles of Russian produce in the English market:—

*Articles Imported from Russia into the United Kingdom, in 1850, in quantities so large as to constitute one-tenth of the total importation of each.\**

	From Russia.		Total Quantity imported into the United Kingdom.
	From Northern Ports.	From Ports within the Black Sea.	
Bristles ..... lbs.	1,954,590	2,132	2,305,685
Wheat ..... qrs.	68,809	569,479	3,738,995
Oats ..... "	277,601	....	1,154,473
Flax ..... cwts.	1,240,766	....	1,822,918
Hemp ..... "	600,519	473	1,048,635
Iron ..... tons	4,645	15	34,066
Linen goods ..... £	6,281	....	6,750
Linseed and flax seed qrs.	320,796	133,447	608,984
Tallow ..... cwts.	841,673	12,471	1,240,645
Tar ..... lasts	9,082	....	12,097

In this table is very distinctly marked the difference between the exports of the Baltic and those of the Black Sea. From the southern ports we receive little besides wheat, and some linseed, with small quantities of tallow and wool. From the northern ports we receive the larger quantity of linseed, some wheat, and a supply of oats nearly equal to one-third of our average annual importations—and flax, hemp, tallow, tar, and bristles in quantities so large as to form the chief part of our foreign supply of each.

To the six important articles, *grain, hemp, flax, tallow, bristles, and linseed*, of which the Russian supply has hitherto formed more than half of all we have usually imported, it is necessary to give more particular attention. I have, therefore, as to each of these articles, compiled a table extending the information given above, as to the year 1850 only, over the fourteen years 1840 to 1853 inclusive.

\* Another article of some importance—though rather for its quality than its quantity—is *timber*. As imported from Russia it is classed in the official accounts as in the following table. The supplies from four other quarters, and the total quantity of each imported in 1850, is added, by way of showing the relative importance, in point of quantity, of what we have hitherto received from Russia. But as the timber of Russia has some peculiar merits of quality, this test of its importance in the British market is not perfect.

Timber imported in 1850.	From Russia.	From Sweden.	From Norway.	From Prussia.	From British North America.	Total imported.
Timber sawn or split ..... } loads	177,196	84,745	56,457	39,757	434,818	794,178
Timber not sawn or split ..... } loads	27,183	29,908	34,197	136,230	618,039	868,179
Lath-wood..... fathoms	5,046	404	7	2,276	4,447	12,195
Staves ..... loads	280	45	126	23,892	....	82,587

All the Russian timber may be said to come from the northern ports.

Were the Russian fleet in command of the Baltic, of course our entire supply of timber from the north of Europe would be stopped.

TABLE I.

*Grain, Meal, and Flour, Imported into the United Kingdom, from Russia and from all Countries, in the Fourteen Years from 1840 to 1853, inclusive.*

Years.	From Russia.			Total from all Countries.
	Northern Ports.	Ports on the Black Sea.	Total from Russia.	
	Qrs.	Qrs.	Qrs.	Qrs.
1840 .....	193,869	250,095	443,964	3,920,014
1841 .....	48,129	82,145	130,274	3,627,562
1842 .....	98,216	260,480	358,696	3,697,279
1843 .....	51,801	30,377	82,178	1,433,891
1844 .....	97,143	104,292	201,435	3,030,681
1845 .....	159,592	30,670	190,262	2,429,916
1846 .....	301,624	172,186	473,810	4,752,174
1847 .....	1,620,026	531,742	2,151,768	11,912,864
1848 .....	371,829	342,823	714,652	7,528,472
1849 .....	340,633	572,735	913,368	10,669,661
1850 .....	363,779	589,250	953,029	9,019,590
1851 .....	572,257	762,160	1,334,417	9,618,026
1852 .....	343,949	957,877	1,301,826	7,746,669
1853 .....	634,404	1,070,483	1,704,887	10,173,135
	4,246,877	4,827,070	9,073,947	66,668,417

Whence it appears that, upon an average of the last seven years, about 14 *per cent.* of our total imports of grain, meal, and flour has come from Russia, of which about 8 *per cent.* came from the ports in the Black Sea, and the remaining 6 *per cent.* from the northern ports.

TABLE II.

*Hemp (undressed) Imported into the United Kingdom, from Russia and from all Countries, in the Fourteen Years from 1840 to 1853, inclusive.\**

Years.	From Russia.	From all Countries.
	Cwts.	Cwts.
1840 .....	598,840	684,068
1841 .....	542,764	652,165
1842 .....	415,565	585,905
1843 .....	463,061	735,743
1844 .....	656,015	913,233
1845 .....	603,286	931,850
1846 .....	620,656	882,894
1847 .....	542,857	811,565
1848 .....	536,400	845,771
1849 .....	636,938	1,061,893
1850 .....	600,519	1,048,635
1851 .....	664,580	1,293,412
1852 .....	543,960	1,068,155
1853 .....	846,370	1,237,872

\* Hemp comes to us almost exclusively from the northern ports.

So that, in the first seven years, we obtained from Russia about 72 *per cent.* of our whole supply, and, in the last seven years, only about 62 *per cent.*—showing that, while we have increased our imports in the proportion of 11 to 6, we have reduced the propor-

tions of the total supply for which we are dependent on Russia in the proportion of 7 to 6.

TABLE III.

*Flax (dressed and undressed) Imported into the United Kingdom, from Russia and from all Countries, in the Fourteen Years from 1840 to 1853, inclusive.\**

Years.	From Russia.	From all Countries.
	Cwts.	Cwts.
1840 .....	870,401	1,253,240
1841 .....	969,457	1,346,843
1842 .....	844,725	1,145,759
1843 .....	1,089,386	1,437,150
1844 .....	1,112,023	1,583,494
1845 .....	859,627	1,418,323
1846 .....	740,396	1,147,092
1847 .....	681,167	1,052,089
1848 .....	1,085,732	1,463,661
1849 .....	1,352,275	1,806,673
1850 .....	1,240,766	1,822,918
1851 .....	818,676	1,194,184
1852 .....	949,907	1,408,714
1853 .....	1,287,988	1,883,374

\* So little flax is received from the ports in the Black Sea, that the entire Russian supply may be treated as coming from the northern ports.

Thus, the average annual importation of flax from Russia, which, in the three years 1841-2-3, was 967,000 cwts., had increased, in 1851-2-3, to an average of 1,018,000 cwts., or by less than 5 per cent. And the quantity imported from other countries increased, in the same period, from an average of 342,000 to one of 477,000 cwts., or by nearly 40 per cent. An indication of the fertility of other sources of foreign flax, which the present high prices cannot but tend further to develop.

TABLE IV.

*Tallow Imported into the United Kingdom, from Russia and from all Countries, in the Fourteen Years from 1840 to 1853, inclusive.†*

Years.	From Russia.	From all Countries.
	Cwts.	Cwts.
1840 .....	1,115,041	1,200,489
1841 .....	1,018,446	1,242,553
1842 .....	842,137	1,011,370
1843 .....	979,728	1,171,618
1844 .....	865,381	1,079,486
1845 .....	925,527	1,194,284
1846 .....	840,181	1,111,818
1847 .....	744,069	1,099,275
1848 .....	988,503	1,498,359
1849 .....	866,327	1,465,629
1850 .....	841,673	1,240,645
1851 .....	810,449	1,221,066
1852 .....	609,233	1,049,703
1853 .....	847,267	1,178,370

† A very small proportion—not more than from 1,000 to 2,000 tons—of the tallow from Russia comes from the southern ports.

The whole quantity of tallow imported from Russia, in the three

years 1841-2-3, was 2,840,000 cwts.; and from other countries, in same three years, 585,000 cwts. In 1851-2-3, from Russia, 2,266,000 cwts.; and from other countries, 1,182,000 cwts. So that, while the Russian supply, in the ten years, fell off by nearly 20 per cent., the supply from other sources increased by more than 100 per cent.

TABLE V.

*Bristles Imported into the United Kingdom, from Russia and from all Countries, in the Fourteen Years from 1840 to 1853, inclusive.*

Years.	From Russia.	From all Countries.
	Lbs.	Lbs.
1840 .....	1,476,761	1,889,504
1841 .....	1,419,514	1,735,502
1842 .....	1,385,579	1,532,739
1843 .....	1,724,370	2,020,435
1844 .....	1,777,916	2,132,300
1845 .....	1,908,456	2,412,267
1846 .....	1,904,711	2,342,782
1847 .....	1,278,570	1,547,981
1848 .....	1,804,924	2,064,739
1849 .....	2,141,505	2,504,676
1850 .....	1,956,722	2,305,685
1851 .....	1,684,773	2,238,710
1852 .....	1,459,303	2,004,676
1853 .....	2,477,789	

Here, too, the supply from other sources has doubled, while that from Russia has scarcely increased.

TABLE VI.

*Linseed and Flax seed Imported into the United Kingdom, from Russia and from all Countries, in the Fourteen Years from 1840 to 1853, inclusive.\**

Years.	From Russia.	From all Countries.
	Bushels.	Bushels.
1840 .....	2,567,316	3,558,070
1841 .....	2,225,543	2,907,685
	Quarters.	Quarters.
1842 .....	276,020	367,700
1843 .....	342,614	470,539
1844 .....	448,393	616,947
1845 .....	523,309	656,793
1846 .....	404,312	506,141
1847 .....	353,900	439,512
1848 .....	655,776	799,650
1849 .....	482,813	626,495
1850 .....	454,243	608,984
1851 .....	417,950	630,471
1852 .....	518,667	799,402
1853 .....	765,015	1,035,335

\* Linseed and flax seed is shipped from the northern ports, and from those in the Black Sea, in proportions varying much in different years; but, on an average, in about equal quantities from each.

On examining these tables together, it will be observed that, as to five of the six articles (grain, hemp, flax, tallow, and bristles),

the supply from other sources has, during the period in view, been increasing faster than the supply from Russia, and, consequently, that there has been a progressive diminution of the extent to which we have been dependent upon that country for a supply. It is also obvious that the increase, such as it is, which has taken place in the imports of all these articles from Russia (excepting tallow) has tended to make the producers of that country somewhat *more* dependent upon the consumption of this country for a remunerative demand.

As to the sixth item, it must be confessed that we are less fortunately placed. The Emperor of Russia is to *bristles* very much what the King of Naples is to *brimstone*—a sort of natural monopolist. It is fortunate the monopolies cannot be exchanged; and that, though we may suffer for a season in our brushes and saddlery, we have not the mortification of seeing a principal ingredient in gunpowder locked up in the hands of such an enemy.

#### PART IV.—PROBABLE EFFECT OF THE WAR.

Let us now consider how the present war is likely to affect a foreign commerce such as that we have described.

Putting aside the trifling amount of commerce carried on through the ports of the White Sea and the Caspian, we have seen that, speaking in round numbers, about one-half in bulk of the exports of Russia pass through her Baltic ports, and the other half through the ports on the Black Sea. In value, however, the amount of the Baltic trade far exceeds all the rest.

To take the Baltic ports first. Of these we need only mention St. Petersburg, Riga, Revel, Windau, and Liebau. And the two first mentioned are so much more important than the rest, that, for our present purpose, they, too, may be passed over. The share of the trade taken by St. Petersburg and Riga may be safely inferred from the following account of the entries of shipping in the three last years for which the returns have yet been published.

*Tonnage of Shipping Entered at the Ports of St. Petersburg and Riga in each of the Three Years 1847, 1848, and 1849.*

	1847.	1848.	1849.
	Tons.	Tons.	Tons.
St. Petersburg.....	449,338	313,617	323,252
Riga.....	285,352	163,105	228,983
	734,690	476,722	553,235

It has been shown (*ante* p. 202) that the tonnage entered at *all* the Russian ports on the Baltic in 1847 was 838,046, and in 1848 was 645,836. It appears, then, that in both years St. Petersburg had more than half the trade in point of bulk, and that Riga had about two-thirds of what remained.

It will be here borne in mind that the chief localities of Russian production are not, as in most other countries, upon or near the coast whence the produce is shipped. The goods exported from St. Petersburg and Riga, coming as they do chiefly from the central

provinces before referred to, have to pass a long distance through the interior; but a distance which, from the facility of land-carriage during the winter months, may be almost as easily travelled in one direction as in another. What, then, is the average distance thus intervening between the place of production and the port of shipment? I conceive this may be estimated, in a manner sufficiently accurate for the present purpose, by taking the distance from about the centre of these provinces to the ports in question.

Examination of the map, and of the figures before given, lead us to the city of Moscow itself as probably the most correct common centre that could be chosen for such a purpose. The distance from Moscow to St. Petersburg, in a straight line, is scarcely 400 miles. Practically, the distance passed over between the two cities may be set down at 480. The like distance between Moscow and Riga appears to be about 630 miles; but against the distance of 150 miles further, by land, to Riga is to be set a saving of sea carriage of some two hundred miles, in consequence of Riga being so much nearer than St. Petersburg to the entrance of the Baltic, which is to be passed by nearly all vessels exporting the produce of Russia.

Imperial regulations, however, have brought as much of the trade through St. Petersburg as imperial authority can compel thither. Riga has only the commerce of its own neighbourhood, with so much of that belonging to the more southerly and western provinces of the empire as the government can divert thither from its more easy and natural outlets through the dominions of a neighbouring power.

So much for the export trade of the central districts around Moscow. But there is, as we have seen, another great centre of production around Warsaw. And this is very differently situated. It will be observed that Poland and the neighbouring provinces of Vilna and Grodno are separated from the Baltic coast only by a slip of Prussian territory, some seventy or eight miles wide. Upon the sea-board of this territory, and upon a line the extremities of which are not more than 200 miles apart, are four Prussian ports, *Dantzic*, *Elbing*, *Konigsburg*, and *Memel*. A fine navigable river (the Vistula) and its tributaries penetrate the entire kingdom of Poland, and even float thitherward much of produce of Russian Grodno, and Austrian Galicia. And though, during the last thirty years, the Russian government has done all in its power, and not without considerable success, to draw the produce of this district northwards, to ports within its own territory (as Windau and Liebau), the natural course of things is still so far maintained as to render these provinces of Russia mainly tributary, by their commerce, to the ports of East Prussia.

It need scarcely be added that, so long as Prussia remains neutral, her ports will remain open, and the passage of Russian produce, across her frontiers, will be unobstructed. Hence it is to be expected that whatever the Russians may wish to exchange for foreign goods, and can afford to sell at a profit on the frontiers of Prussia, they may continue to produce for exportation, though every port they have on the Baltic be closely blockaded.

Nor does it seem likely that the central provinces will, in the event of a continuance of the war, find the Prussian ports much less

serviceable to them than they are obviously fitted to be to Poland and the neighbouring provinces in the west.

We have already set down the average distance of these central provinces from St. Petersburg at 480 miles, and from Riga at 630 miles. On like data the distance from Moscow to Königsburg cannot be estimated at more than about 800 miles. And against the additional land carriage of 320 miles (as compared with St. Petersburg) there is a distance of some 500 miles saved by sea—Königsburg being at least so much nearer to the Sound than St. Petersburg.

It will also be observed, on consulting a recent map of these countries, that *Cracow*, at the southern extremity of Poland, and *Posen*, but a short distance from the western frontier of that country, are already within the limits of the continental railway system. Goods reaching either of those cities from Russia are in immediate communication with Stettin, Hamburg, and all the Dutch and Belgian ports; and depôts of foreign produce, formed at either city, and destined for Russian consumption, might be rapidly supplied by steam transit from any of the ports of England, France, Belgium, Holland, or Prussia, and the goods easily placed *en route* for Warsaw, St. Petersburg, or Moscow.

When the projected lines from Dantzic to Posen, and from Posen direct to Cracow, shall be completed, the exportable produce of Poland and Galicia must tend to seek a railway route to Dantzic or Hamburg, or even to Ostend: a tendency operating directly in proportion to the value and the portability of the produce.\* But whether this tendency of the German railway system to draw westward the trade, now, by the imperial system of Russia, drawn northwards to Riga or St. Petersburg, or southwards to Odessa, will be permitted to operate with any degree of freedom, must depend much upon the duration and the issue of the present struggle. That while hostilities continue, and the Prussian frontier remains passable, the more free and natural course of trade will be permitted by the Czar for his own sake, though to the detriment of the imperial system, is obvious: a benefit to the cause he fights against, which may, for the present, reconcile us to the equivocal attitude of one of the four powers.

So long, then, as Prussia remains neutral, the eastern half of that country, as it obviously possesses the coast-line naturally appendent to the kingdom of Poland, and to the Russian provinces immediately adjoining that kingdom on the east, may be expected to afford a passage for the trade of these provinces, with all the ease, and all the willingness, with which mercantile men, who have long seen trade diverted from its natural channel through their own hands, see it come back in consequence of the temporary weakness of the disturber.

From the ports of the Black Sea, the only regular supplies we

\* From Cracow to Dantzic, and thence to the Thames, would be about 400 miles of rail, and 1,200 of sea. From Cracow to the Thames, by Hamburg, about 500 miles of each. And between the same points, by Ostend, adds some 250 miles more of rail, but shortens the entire distance by at least 100 miles. At present, the corn of Galicia, if shipped at Odessa, has 300 or 400 miles of inland carriage, and a troublesome sea voyage of some 4,000 miles. Polish corn, shipped at Dantzic, reaches that port by 200 or 300 miles of interior carriage, chiefly down the Vistula; and thus encounters an intricate navigation of at least 1,200 miles.

receive are of corn and seeds, with a small quantity of wool and tallow, and a few articles of no importance—as the following list of our imports thence, in 1849 and 1850, will sufficiently show:—

*Articles Imported into the United Kingdom from Russian Ports within the Black Sea in the Years 1849 and 1850.*

	1849.	1850.
Bristles..... lbs.	....	2,132
Cheese..... cwt.	2	....
Coffee..... lbs.	86	82
Wheat..... qrs.	546,501	569,479
Other corn..... "	26,234	19,897
Currants and figs..... cwt.	27	6
Flax..... "	60	....
Hemp..... "	....	473
Hides..... "	36	....
Iron..... tons	12	15
Madder root..... cwt.	100	....
Opium..... lbs.	871	....
Linseed and flax seed qrs.	45,979	133,447
Rape seed..... "	1,924	10,185
Tallow..... cwt.	108,287	12,471
Tea..... lbs.	38	....
Tobacco..... "	30	39
Wine..... galls.	76	19
Timber..... loads	41	39
Wool..... lbs.	4,786,120	2,632,639

Corn, wool, and tallow, then, are the only articles with regard to which an entire stoppage of our trade with the Russian ports of the Black Sea would affect this country. And how insignificant such a stoppage would be to us may be inferred from the following comparison of the quantity of each of these three articles imported thence in the two years 1849 and 1850, with the quantity of each imported into this country from all parts of the world in the same year:—

	Imported from Russian Ports in the Black Sea.	Total Quantity Imported into the United Kingdom.
	1849.	1849.
Corn..... qrs.	572,735	10,669,661
Wool..... lbs.	4,786,120	76,768,647
Tallow..... cwt.	108,287	1,465,629
	1850.	1850.
Corn..... qrs.	589,250	9,019,590
Wool..... lbs.	2,632,639	74,326,778
Tallow..... cwt.	12,471	1,240,645

Assuming the trade, on an average of years, to be fairly represented by these figures, the *corn* would form only about 6 *per cent.*, the *wool* about 3 *per cent.*, and the *tallow* from 1 to 7 *per cent.* of all we have been accustomed to import.



But, reverting to what has been said of the facilities for interior carriage in Russia, and of the great distances over which nearly all the exportable produce of the country must be carried before it reaches the place of shipment, we may safely infer that the greater part of the produce now shipped in the Black Sea would, were that outlet closed to it for more than one season, find its way to the shores of the Baltic. It is also to be borne in mind that the Russian export trade of the Black Sea is chiefly concentrated at Odessa; that that port is supplied from the country west of the Dnieper, and drained by that river and the Bug and the Dniester; and that this, the most fruitful part of the Russian dominions on the Black Sea, is at once most open to the means of transport to the Baltic already in use for Galicia and Poland, and is also the territory obviously most likely to be occupied by the allies of Turkey, in the event of a protracted contest, and an advance by the allies upon the most recently acquired and most southern dominions of Russia.

Were this paper not already quite long enough to be brought before the Society at one meeting, I might be permitted to strengthen the views here suggested by reference to a former occasion of a somewhat similar nature. The ports of Russia were formally closed to our commerce, under treaty with France, from October, 1807, to July, 1812. The German powers may be supposed to have been at least as willing as Russia to enforce this prohibition, their ports being similarly closed at the same time. But the official accounts of the period go far to show that the interruption of the trade between this country and Russia was, after the first year or two, not very great.\* It is true that the circumstances of the two periods are, in some important respects, widely different; but the difference, I conceive, is almost entirely such as to favour the conclusion to which the facts I have brought forward seem most directly to point.

\* On the 7th of July, 1807, the treaty of Tilsit was signed. By this act, Russia detached herself from England and joined France, undertaking to mediate between England and France, and, if the mediation were refused, to close her ports to British commerce. On 31st October following (the season being over), the ports of Russia were closed accordingly. On 10th February, 1808, Russia declared war against Sweden, for not co-operating in excluding British vessels from the Baltic. But Russia soon ceased to act heartily on the French system. The nobles preferred selling the raw produce of their estates to seeing it rot in aid of Napoleon's crusade against British commerce. They also lacked tropical produce, and the means of paying for it. So the trade continued, though partially in neutral bottoms and at increased cost. On the 18th of July, 1812, Russia made peace with Great Britain. The following summary will show how far the average annual amount of the trade between the two countries varied under these circumstances:—

*Exports.*—Official value, from Great Britain to Russia, during the *five* years, 1803–7, average annual amount, 1,471,000*l.* In the *four* years of war, 1808–11, 720,564*l.* In the *five* years, 1812–17 (the records for 1813 being destroyed), 1,768,000*l.*

*Imports.*—Official value, from Russia into Great Britain, during the five years, 1801–7, 2,454,000*l.* In the four years of war, 1808–11, 1,778,000*l.* In the five years, 1812–17, 2,117,000*l.*

It will be observed that these values, being taken by fixed official prices, are unaffected by the actual variations of price, and so may be regarded simply as indications of *quantity*, and so compared. And the figures given, referring only to the trade officially recorded as carried on between the two countries, may be supposed to exclude, during the first years of the war, much that passed through neutral channels.

This conclusion may be stated in a few words. It is that, while Prussia remains neutral, the efforts we make to put a stop to commercial intercourse between Russia and the rest of the world, will result in little more than transferring to Prussian ports the greater part of the trade hitherto carried on through the ports of Russia.\*

The *people* of Russia would suffer from such a transfer mainly in the annoyance and loss always incident to an obstruction or disturbance of the ordinary channels of traffic—the *nobles or landowners* in a lower price obtained for their exportable produce, and a higher price paid for imported comforts and luxuries—and the *government* in a partial loss of the revenue derived from trade, and such a restoration of the main commerce of the country to its natural outlets as cannot but postpone, if it do not ultimately prevent, the realization of the despotic scheme which makes St. Petersburg, in spite of nature, the capital city and chief port of the empire.

The sufferings of the people will, at worst, be temporary; for, could the transfer continue but a few years, it would confer all the countervailing benefits of a more natural state of things; while the damage done to the artificial system of the government would be certain, considerable, and probably irreparable. But England and

\* Since this paper was read, a gentleman who was present on that occasion has written to Prussia on the subject. I have been favoured with a copy of the correspondence, “corroborating very decidedly” the conclusion here expressed. The following is an extract from the letter of a mercantile firm, dated “Dantzic, 5 July, 1854”:

“In reply to your query about the Russian trade taking its way to East Prussia in consequence of the war with Russia continuing, as well as the neutrality of Prussia, we beg to express our opinion that this will be decidedly the case, inasmuch as it is already, since the beginning of the year, organised to some extent. The goods destined for Riga and Petersburg are mostly sent on to *Memel*, some few to *Königsburg*, from which places the *caravan system* has been adopted, and is carried on with a great deal of regularity. The goods thus sent from England consist, for the most part, of cotton (raw material) and colonial produce, *coffee*, sugar, tea, &c., whilst *coals*, of which Russia seems most in want, find this conveyance of course far too dear. The St. Petersburg and Riga houses send in return, by the same waggons, their produce, such as hemp, tallow, flax, linseed, and grain, to their *Memel* agents, who follow their orders in directing the stuff to the various ports of England, France, Holland, and Belgium. Thus the Prussian merchants earn a very good commission, and it appears that at least present prices allow of this trade being continued on a large scale. There is such a want of warehouses at *Memel* that rents are excessively high, and we understand a good deal of merchandise is warehousing in open yards. There is only one article of Russian produce which cannot reach Prussia for being sent through her ports to England and France, and for which yet there is a great want. We refer to *wood*, the fine timber and masts from Riga, the St. Petersburg deals and battens. Only a few parcels of masts seek their way through the small river *Narew* into the *Vistula*, and thus come to *Dantzic*. The Russian timber trade, however, speaking generally, may be considered as paralysed.”

We declared war against Russia on the 28th of March last. At that date the usual winter arrangements for transmission of produce from the interior to the seaports were complete. The produce was either already warehoused in St. Petersburg and Riga, or well on its way thither. When the blockade of these ports began the snow was gone. To carry the produce thus awkwardly placed, from St. Petersburg and Riga down to the ports of East Prussia, carriage by waggons became necessary; and these were found equally necessary to carry the corresponding imports up to St. Petersburg. Hence the state of things described in the above letter. But if the war continues till next spring, we shall doubtless see the present year's produce brought direct, during the winter, from the places of production to the ports of East Prussia nearest to these places, thus realising more precisely, and in a more regular form, the anticipations expressed in the text.—J. T. D.

France in arms will hardly permit a new settlement of the channels of trade between Russia and her neighbours, anterior to a general peace. A state of war must be a state of change—achieved or expected—and in either case is destructive of that confidence in the future which is of the essence of all settled mercantile arrangements. Should Austria frankly join and strongly act with the allies, and should the resistance of Russia continue, it is more than probable that Russia will, during the next twelve months, have to retreat not only from the invaded provinces, but from the Crimea, and the whole line of coast from Azof to the mouths of the Danube. Were such a position to be attained by the allies, and Prussia still to remain neutral, the entire trade of Russia, westward, would be carried on over the Prussian frontiers, much to the profit of the government and people of that country. In view of this state of things, St. Petersburg and Riga, already useless as ports, and all the Russian ports on the Black Sea, might be destroyed without materially affecting the commercial pressure of the war upon the Czar. Russia would be surrounded by a circle of belligerents, broken only by the intervention of a single neutral state—that state, however, being singularly well placed for carrying on the obstructed trade of the beleaguered state. And in the event, said to have been already threatened by the Czar, of a final retreat upon the central provinces, and the allies permitting the war to resolve itself, as they then probably would, into a mere shutting up of the general disturber, by holding in possession every avenue between Moscow and civilized Europe, the neutrality of Prussia would become the sole hope of the enemy, and, in all probability, the sole obstacle to peace. Nor would the removal of this obstacle be a matter of slight import. Small as is the commerce of Russia, it is much greater now than it was forty years ago; and could not be entirely stopped without causing much suffering among some who, even in Russia, are not apt to suffer in silence. Hemmed into the central provinces, the Czar would be driven to rely for support mainly upon the ancient land-holding, as distinguished from the modern office-holding, aristocracy. And when the imperial perseverance in schemes of territorial aggrandisement, which have always, under the family of Romanoff, been closely linked with other schemes for suppressing the influence of these ancient nobles, shall produce an entire stoppage of the incomes they derive from the exportation of hemp, flax, and tallow, an explosion may be looked for of the direction of which Russian history has already furnished several examples.\*

If, then, in the last extremity, we should be met by a repetition of the plan so much vaunted for its success against the French in 1812, it may become expedient effectually to *blockade* instead of *penetrating* the empire; and therefore to compel the abandonment of any “neutrality” opposed to this policy.

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\* “As for any revolutions which could possibly arise out of the discontent of the old aristocracy, we may be assured they will never be directed against the political and moral system of the country; they will always be, as they have always been, aimed solely against the individual at the head of the government. Conspiracies of this kind are the only ones now possible in Russia.”—Xavier H. de Hell, “Travels in the Steppes of the Caspian Sea.” Chap. xiv.